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Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s Causal Modeling




Markus (2021) argues that the causal modeling frameworks of Pearl
and Rubin are not “strongly equivalent”, in the sense of saying “the same
thing in different ways”. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong
equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated
not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic mod-
eling choices.
1 Introduction
Keith Markus’ (2021) comparison of the causal frameworks associated with
Pearl, Rubin, and Lewis is a gift to scholars of causation. The differences be-
tween Pearl and Rubin’s frameworks – called structural causal models (SCMs)
and Rubin causal models (RCMs), respectively – have been especially obscure
to outsiders not already committed to one of them. As each has impacted a
wide swath of disciplines (which tend to adopt one or the other) the question
of whether they differ in style or substance is significant for causal methodol-
ogy. Markus’ article offers both a guide to those perplexed by the competition
between these frameworks and a demonstration that comparing them is philo-
sophically worthwhile. I am hopeful that Markus’ article will serve as a starting
point for a fruitful literature comparing the approaches, and thus offer this
commentary evaluating what it has and has not established.
2 Strong and Weak Equivalence
Although I will focus on SCMs and RCMs, a brief comparison of Pearl and Lewis
will help situate Markus’ discussion. Lewis (1973) provides counterfactuals with
a “possible worlds” semantics. He views possible worlds as conceptually prior to
causes, in the sense that he explicates causation using counterfactuals. Galles
and Pearl (1998) discuss Lewis’ counterfactual semantics in isolation from his
philosophical commitments, and prove that were one (contra Lewis) to inter-
pret claims about the closeness of possible worlds in terms of interventions on
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variables in causal models, doing so would require no restrictions beyond those
already in Lewis’ framework. While they do not claim to have shown that Pearl
and Lewis’ frameworks are equivalent, Pearl does claim this elsewhere (Pearl
et al. 2016, p. 126).
Markus argues that Pearl and Lewis’ frameworks are not “strongly equiva-
lent” in the sense of saying “the same thing in different ways” (2021, p. 3). At
best, Galles and Pearl show that one can take Lewis’ notation and assimilate it
into Pearl’s framework. This might demonstrate “weak equivalence” (3), mean-
ing that one can give the formal expressions in one framework an interpretation
within the others. But it does not show that the expressions within each frame-
work express the same things. Of course, Pearl can argue that the ability to
do without a possible worlds metaphysics is an advantage of his account (Pearl
2009, § 7.4.1; Woodward 2003, § 3.6), but this advantage does not derive from
the frameworks being strongly equivalent. Clearly, they are not.
Markus sees Pearl’s comparison of Rubin’s framework with his own as flawed
in a similar way. Pearl adopts RCM notation to express causal counterfactuals,
and interprets these counterfactuals within his own framework. As with Pearl’s
discussion of Lewis, this strategy can only establish the weak equivalence of the
frameworks. This opens the door to asking whether RCMs and SCMs are in fact
strongly equivalent, and Markus argues they are not. He also raises concerns
about whether they are even weakly equivalent (see Halpern 2000), though here
I will focus on his arguments against strong equivalence.
Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence highlight ways in which a
model within one framework expresses something different than the correspond-
ing model from the other.1 In my view, this is an unsatisfactory way to evaluate
strong equivalence. Since strong equivalence concerns the expressive power of
the frameworks, the relevant question is not whether a particular model within
one framework says the same thing as a model within the other, but rather
whether any scenario expressible within one framework can be expressed by
some (set of) model(s) within the other. Evaluating strong equivalence by
pairwise comparison of models amounts to adopting the unreasonably stringent
requirement that strongly equivalent theories have a one-to-one correspondence.
More concretely, consider Markus’ discussions of correlated disturbances (pp.
7, 11). With SCMs, one either A) assumes the variable set modeled includes
all common causes of variables in the set (this is called causal sufficiency) or
B) uses “bi-directed arcs” to indicate possible unmeasured common causes. As-
suming that disturbances (or “error terms”) correspond to unmeasured causes
of measured variables, this entails that if two variables are not connected by a
bi-directed arc, their disturbances have no common cause, and thus will be un-
correlated. Markus emphasizes that within SCMs, accepting a model in which
1Markus in fact claims that the same model can be interpreted differently within each
framework (p. 7), but since models across different frameworks cannot be literally the same,
I talk of models as “corresponding to” one another. It will be convenient for the exposition
to treat such pairings as unproblematic glosses of what it is for RCM and SCM models to be
“the same” – my criticism on Markus depends not on the details of the pairing, but on his
assumption that strong equivalence should be tested with pairwise comparisons.
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disturbances are uncorrelated amounts to ruling out the possibility that there is
a correlation. Such assumptions underwrite results about when a causal effect
is identifiable from a probability distribution (Pearl 2009, ch. 3). This contrasts
with RCMs, which allow for uncertainty regarding whether disturbances are
uncorrelated. Markus presents a scenario in which an SCM model rules out
correlated errors, but the corresponding RCM does not, and takes this to show
that the frameworks are not strongly equivalent.
Markus sees it as besides the point that SCMs can represent correlated
disturbances (p. 7), but using a different model than the one he considers. His
point is that there are cases where an RCM allows for correlated disturbances,
but its SCM counterpart does not. But the fact that some SCM can represent
the same scenario as the RCM is what one should care about. If it could be
shown that any scenario represented in one framework could be represented in
the other, this would establish that each framework can say ‘the same thing in
different ways’ and would vindicate Pearl’s treatment of the frameworks as inter-
translatable. This is not to say that each framework might not be better suited
for different aims. Given Pearl’s aim of giving a general account of identifiability,
it makes sense to design models allowing the user to unambiguously specify
that the errors are uncorrelated. To express uncertainty about whether certain
error terms are in fact uncorrelated, the SCM modeler could link the relevant
variables with a bi-directed arc.2 But the model does not internally distinguish
between the insertion of an arc to indicate belief in the existence of a latent
common cause and its insertion to indicate uncertainty, and the ability of RCMs
to explicitly represent uncertainty might thus be construed as an advantage.
Such pragmatic differences merit philosophical attention, but are not relevant
to semantic questions about framework equivalence.
A further argument against strong equivalence relies on the fact that SCMs,
but not RCMs, explicitly refer to a causal model in their notation. That is,
while Rubin’s potential outcomes are primitives denoting how individuals would
counterfactually respond to experimental treatments, Pearl’s counterfactuals are
evaluated by reference to a model describing an individual.3 Markus claims that
this rules out strong equivalence. An SCM modeler who adopts a false causal
model for an individual will be forced to accept false causal counterfactuals
about that individual. In contrast, an RCM modeler can denote counterfactu-
als about an individual without committing to a particular causal model. Ac-
cordingly, SCMs lack the notation to represent a mismatch between one’s causal
model and the empirical individual one uses it to represent. This, however, does
not show that RCMs can represent scenarios that SCMs cannot. In cases where
a particular SCM fails to represent an individual, there is an available model
that can represent her – namely, the correct model.
Markus’ final argument against strong equivalence concerns “non-identical
2Note that without assumptions such as minimality, frugality, or faithfulness, variables
linked by a bidirected arc are not necessarily correlated.
3In table 2, Markus indicates that the counterfactuals in RCMs (but not SCMs) are “model-
independent” features of the world. As both frameworks rely on modeling assumption I do
not see this distinction as tenable. See Heckman (2005) for relevant discussion.
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but necessarily numerically equal” (p. 6) variables. Consider the equation
X = Z. Interpreted within SCM, this is a “modular” structural equation,
meaning that its right-hand side may be replaced while leaving the other equa-
tions unchanged. This contrasts with Rubin (1974), who Markus reads as al-
lowing X and Z to necessarily take on the same values. Markus suggests that
the SCM with X = Z allows for a wider range of possibilities than the corre-
sponding RCM, as only the former allows the variables to vary independently.
Considered, however, in terms of expressive power, this appears to be a fur-
ther example in which RCMs represent a possibility that SCMs cannot: SCMs
cannot represent two variables as both distinct and necessary equivalent.
In what sense are the variables in question “necessarily” equivalent? One
possibility is that they are necessarily equal because they denote the same quan-
tity. Since such an equivalence might be non-transparent, one might permit
one’s framework to represent the variables separately. But this would be a
modeler’s convenience rather than an extension in the framework’s ability to
represent states of the world. Another possibility is that the variables refer to
distinct quantities that must match due to standing in some non-causal neces-
sitation relationship. Would this prove that RCMs can represent non-causal
relationships that SCMs cannot? Not necessarily. A framework can represent
causal relationships among a variable set containing non-causally related vari-
ables without thereby providing a semantics for the non-causal relationships
modelled. Such a framework might allow non-causally related variables into
the model, but treat them as a nuisance to be cordoned off to facilitate causal
inference. If so, then the framework should not be understood as extending the
worldly relationships that can be modeled, but rather as loosening the restric-
tions on which variables are allowed within causal models.
3 Case Study: Consistency
For the reasons provided, I deny that Markus has shown the frameworks to
be not strongly equivalent. Markus would respond that he has, insofar as he
has shown that the corresponding models are interpreted differently across the
frameworks. The strong/weak distinction is Markus’ and he is free to use the
terms as he wishes. What matters is whether the distinction supports his cri-
tique that when Pearl uses notation from alternative frameworks within his own,
it means something different than when interpreted within those frameworks. I
have suggested whether formalisms share an interpretation should not be eval-
uated based on one-to-one correspondence, but rather based on whether the
frameworks can express the same causal scenarios. I now motivate this position
by appeal to a prior debate between RCM and SCM proponents.
Recall Markus’ appeal to the fact that only SCMs explicitly refer to models in
their notation. Within SCM, the bridge between models and reality is provided
by a theorem called consistency. It says that given that a person actually
receives a treatment, the observed outcome (i.e. effect) is the one that the
model says the individual would have were they to receive that treatment (in
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SCM notation: X(u) = x ⇒ Y (u) = Yx(u)). The status of this principle has
been a source of debate between SCM and RCM theorists, and thus serves as a
test case for comparisons of the frameworks.4
Within Lewis’ counterfactual theory (Lewis 1973, § 1.7), consistency follows
from the assumption that every world is closest to itself. From the counterfac-
tual “Were I to paint the wall red, my uncle would be happy”, it follows that
if I actually paint the wall red, my uncle is happy. One might worry that the
antecedent could obtain, but with side effects producing an outcome different
from that given by the consequent. If the red paint is toxic, my uncle’s happiness
would be a dubious proposition. A consistency defender would reply that if the
paint is toxic, one should not accept the stated counterfactual. This back-and-
forth regarding consistency is recapitulated among causal modelers (Cole and
Frangakis 2009; VanderWeele 2009; Pearl 2010). Consider an SCM licensing the
counterfactual that participants in a job program will increase their employa-
bility. Yet participants who are forced to participate in the program might be
resentful and consequently not get its benefits. Pearl’s response: if so, then one
should not accept a model entailing that those individuals would be helped.
Many RCM modelers will not be satisfied with Pearl’s response. An exper-
imenter testing the effects of a voluntary job program that does not produce
resentment might have no position on whether the program would produce re-
sentment as a side-effect among those who are forced to participate. Yet Pearl’s
approach requires that if one models the treatment as “job program” and the
outcome as “employability”, one must take a stance on the general causal re-
lationship between these variables, and thus places a burden on modelers to
answer questions they might not want to address. This motivates VanderWeele
(2009) to avoid building consistency into the axioms of RCMs, and instead treat
it as an empirical assumption requiring case-by-case evaluation.
RCMs interpreted without consistency have fewer implications than the cor-
responding SCMs. But this is compatible with the frameworks being in an
important sense interchangeable. RCM modelers can express the content of
SCMs by accepting consistency. And SCM modelers can respond to alleged
counterexamples to consistency by providing a model satisfying it. Yet the de-
bate teaches us more than that the frameworks can express the same scenarios.
Although it implies the semantic non-equivalence of corresponding SCM and
RCM models, at its core it is a pragmatic dispute over modeling methodology.
There is a trade-off between requiring more assumption-laden models represent-
ing the general relationships among a set of variables and allowing less general
models that make fewer commitments, but which are limited to modeling vari-
ables within localized experimental contexts. Faced with this trade-off, RCM
and SCM modelers make different choices.
4Consistency is part of SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption)(Imbens and
Rubin 2015, § 1.6), which is better known for ruling out interaction among units. See Sobel
(2006) and Vanderweele et al. (2013) for discussions of how to model such interactions.
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4 Manipulability
Although Markus’ primary target is the strong equivalence of the frameworks,
he briefly considers whether they “assume different forms of causation” (p. 8).
His most direct evidence that they do is that Pearl asserts, while some RCM
theorists deny,5 that so-called “non-manipulable” variables can be causes (Pearl
2019; Holland 1986, 2008). Race and gender, which arguably cannot be exper-
imentally manipulated, are key examples of such variables. The disagreement
over whether certain variables can be causes suggests that the frameworks make
different commitments regarding causation, and is at odds with the more con-
ciliatory treatment of the frameworks I have been defending.
My response is that although advocates of the frameworks adopt conflict-
ing positions regarding certain variables, these positions are not forced upon
them by their frameworks. When one moves away from thorny variables such
as race and gender and looks at debates regarding slightly less contentious vari-
ables such as obesity (Hernán and Taubman 2008; Pearl 2018), the modeling
issues in play significantly overlap with those arising in the consistency debate.
Whereas RCM modelers link potential outcomes to particular experimental ma-
nipulations, SCM modelers represent manipulations by formally applying the
do-operator to variables in a graph. Let’s reserve the term “interventions” for
variables characterized by this operator. Provided that the treatment variable is
not “ambiguous” (Spirtes and Scheines 2004), the effects of interventions on an
outcome will be invariant across distinct ways of manipulating the treatment.
The first-order debate appears to be not over the difference between manipu-
lable and non-manipulable variables, but rather one regarding whether causal
claims should be linked to particular manipulations or rather characterized as
interventions on variables allowing for distinct manipulations.
Admittedly, Pearl does assert that that one can intervene upon gender with-
out specifying a manipulation. He would, however, require “do(gender)” to
be well-defined, which requires there be at least hypothetical manipulations on
gender (perhaps available only to “Lady Nature herself” (Pearl 2018, p. 4)).
Whether such a manipulation is coherent is debatable, and resolving this debate
would require careful attention to the purportedly non-manipulable variable.
Given SCM modelers’ willingness to characterize interventions in a way that
abstracts away from concrete manipulations, it is unsurprising that they would
have a higher tolerance than RCM modelers for talk of hypothetical manipula-
tions. Yet the frameworks themselves do not settle what one should say about
particular “non-manipulable” variables.
5 Individuals and Populations
While I have here focused on Markus’ central philosophical thesis, my argument
in no way undermines the value of Markus’ characterization of the differences
5Many methodologists (e.g. VanderWeele 2016) view RCMs as tools for quantitatively
defining causal effects, and caution against drawing conclusions for what counts as a cause.
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between the approaches, summarized in his table 2 (p. 12). My criticisms only
target his explanation of these differences by appeal to the non-equivalence of
the frameworks. I further endorse his positions that Pearl has not established
strong equivalence, and that even if he had, comparing the frameworks would
still be worthwhile.
I will now highlight one benefit of considering the potential outcomes frame-
work alongside Pearl’s. The former, by including a subscript for the individual
in its notation, forces the user to attend to issues of aggregation and abstraction
in a way that SCM does not. This is evident from the centrality of “the funda-
mental problem of causal inference” (Holland 1986) to RCM. The crux of the
problem is that although an individual’s causal effect is the difference between
her outcomes under treatment and control conditions, one only ever observes
one of these outcomes. The solution is that, in the limit, randomization ensures
that the difference in expected outcomes between the treatment and control
groups measures the average effect across the individuals. Note that the aver-
age effect is just as much identifiable with the SCM framework, and that the
RCM framework never in reality identifies the effect for an individual charac-
terized using a maximally fine-grained description. But the RCM framework
makes salient the way that population-level causal relationships aggregate over
individual-level effects in a way that may not be transparent when using an
SCM to identify the relationships given a joint probability distribution.
One might suppose that RCMs’ emphasis on individual-level causes indi-
cates that they interpret causation differently from SCMs. Yet population- and
individual-level causes need not be understood as picking out distinct causal
concepts. The view that they are is encouraged by the position (Sober 1984)
that “type” and “token” causation pick out two metaphysical relations, one be-
tween properties and the other between events. Yet careful observers of SCMs
have denied that claims about populations and individuals employ distinct meta-
physical concepts (Hausman 2005; Woodward 2003, p. 40). Individuals can be
considered either as concrete tokens or as types characterized by their proper-
ties, and type-level causal relationships generalize over counterfactuals about
token individuals.6 RCM discussions of the “fundamental problem” support
this analysis. The view that claims about individuals and populations pick out
distinct causal concepts remains prevalent, but in my view should be abandoned.
6 Conclusion
I conclude that Markus’ has shown neither that RCM and SCM are strongly non-
equivalent nor that they employ distinct notions of causation. Disputes between
proponents of the frameworks are better understood as what Weinberger and
Bradley (2020) call a “non-factual disagreement”. Non-factual disagreements
concern not some first-order fact within the domain of dispute, but reflect dif-
6Actual causation (Halpern and Hitchcock 2015) is sometimes called “token” causation,
but accounts of this notion engage in a project of limited relevance to causal inference and
estimation – that of ascribing post-hoc responsibility for the occurrence of an effect.
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ferent views of the aims and methods for studying the domain. Regarding SCM
and RCM modelers, Markus succinctly captures their distinct aims as follows:
SCM seeks to encapsulate general scientific knowledge represented
in multi-purpose causal models and use them to guide estimation of
various causal effects included in the model. In contrast, RCM in-
stead emphasizes the representation of specific events in the context
of a specific study. (p. 9)
The dispute arises because proponents of each frameworks see their aims as
primary and view the tools of the other as being ill-suited for addressing the
questions they view as most important. Should the frameworks turn out to be
strongly equivalent, this would not motivate focusing on one framework to the
exclusion of another, as there are insights that arise when using each that are
less transparent when using the other. But the insights to be gleaned pertain
not to metaphysics, but to modeling.
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